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There is supposed to be a gulf between mind and 
matter, and a mystery which it is held in some 
degree impious to dissipate. I believe, for my 
part, that there is no greater mystery than 
there is in the transformation by the radio of 
electromagnetic waves into sounds. I think the 
mystery is produced by a wrong conception of the 
physical world and by a Manichean fear of degrad-
ing the mental world to the level of the suppos-
edly inferior world of matter 
B. Russell 
My Philosophical ~velopment, p. 22. 
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SYNOPSIS 
Chapter One presents one formulation of the problem 
which different versions of the identity theory attempt to 
solve. The attempted solutions offered by other versions of 
the identity theory are evaluated. 
Chapter Two is a statement of the identity theory. 
It restricts the discussion to the identity of sensations 
and brain processes. It tries to clarity what is to count 
as a sensation and what as a brain process. Some introduc-
tory remarks are made in it about the nature of the concept 
of identity. 
Chapter Three is concerned with distinguishing the 
factual and logical (in the widest sense of these terms) 
components of the identity theory. It is argued that they 
cannot be treated in isolation of each other. The indepen-
dent identification of sensations through nonverbal behaviour, 
and of brain processes through brain-readings is discussed. 
Chapters Four and Five are devoted to a discussion 
of avowals. It is argued that sensations can be identified 
through avowals as well. The nature of avowals is discussed; 
it is argued that the typical avowal is corrigible, and that 
v 
avowals have grounds. A1 ternative analyses of avowals are 
discussed. 
Chapter Six takes up the question whether or not sen-
sations can be said to have spatial location. It is argued 
that an affirmative answer can be given if we recognize that 
sensations, like all processes, can be said to have spatial 
location only in a derivative sense. 
Chapter Seven examines the nature of the identity 
between sensations and brain processes. Identity is argued 
to be an empirical, extensional, heterogeneons, reductive 
identity of properties. 
The task of Chapter Eight is twofold: first, to 
meet the objection that the identity proposed is too weak--
and thus compatible with the distinctness of sensations and 
brain processes; and second, to compare the identity theory 
with dualism and with the oriteriological view. 
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